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CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF
SPEED
William E. Scheuerman*
The fact of change has been so continual and so intense that it
overwhelms our minds. We are bewildered by the spectacle of
its rapidity, scope, and intensity .... Industrial habits have
changed most rapidly; there has followed at considerable distance, change in political relations; alterations in legal relations and methods have lagged even more .... This fact defines the primary, though not by any means the ultimate,
responsibility of a liberalism that intends to be a vital force.
-John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (1935)

1

Defenders of constitutionalism would do well to heed
Dewey's observation that the rapid-fire pace of contemporary
social and economic activity poses considerable challenges. For
sure, an impressive body of political and legal thought already
addresses the nexus between constitutions and social and economic change. Both Progressive-era intellectuals and the Legal
Realists, to some extent inspired by Dewey, harshly criticized
the U.S. Constitution for its seeming inability to adjust effectively to twentieth-century social and economic conditions. 2
Since the late nineteenth century, advocates of social reform
have repeatedly attacked Article V, arguing that its burdensome
amendment procedures undermine possibilities for constitutional adaptation required by the changing realities of social and
economic life. The left-wing journalist Daniel Lazare's recent
characterization of the U.S. political system as subject to an
anachronistic "frozen constitution" fundamentally inimical toreform is only the latest salvo in a series of harsh reviews of Article
* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota. I am grateful
to Brian Bix, Jamie Druckman, Dion Farganis, and Tim Johnson for detailed written
comments on an earlier version of this paper, as well as Mary Dietz, Jim Farr, and
Gordon Silverstein for words of encouragement.
I. John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action 57-58 (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1935).
2. John R. Vile, The Constitutional Amending Process in American Political
Thought 137-56 (Praeger, 1992).
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V previously proffered by suffragists, supporters of a constitutional ban on child labor, and New Dealers who sought a formal
amendment codifying the welfare state. 3 For their part, many
liberals in the legal academy long have touted the merits of an
elastic "living constitution," arguing that only flexibility in legal
exegesis can keep the constitution attuned to the challenges of
social and economic dynamism. They consider the literalist and
originalist modes of interpretation propounded by conservative
rivals wrong-headed in part because such views allegedly obscure constitutionalism's temporal presuppositions: Written constitutions are intended to remain a source of binding law for "an
indefinite but presumably long future," but constitutions can fulfill this function only if we interpret their norms flexibly in order
to allow for adaptability amidst "so continual and so intense" social change. 4
In light of this rich tradition of intellectual debate, it might
seem presumptuous to assert that scholars have failed to focus
sufficiently on the threats generated by social and economic dynamism to constitutionalism. Nonetheless, I argue here that contemporary debates in social theory provide renewed significance
to the familiar question of the nexus between social change and
constitutionalism. 5 In 1935, when Dewey referred to the "rapidity, scope, and intensity" of social and economic change, he anticipated a core theme of recent social theory, according to
which we can only make sense of present-day social and eco-

3. Daniel Lazare, The Frozen Republic: How che Conscicucion Is Paralizing Democracy (Harcourt Brace & Co., 1996); David E. Kyvig, Explicic and Auchencic Aces:
Amending che U.S. Conscicucion, 1776-1995 at 216-314 (U. of Kansas Press, 1996).
4. Richard Kay, Conscicucional Chrononomy, 13 Ratio Juris 31,33 (2000).
5. The concept of constitutionalism is a complex and controversial one. For some
of the difficulties at hand, sec Larry Alexander, ed., Conscicucionalism: Philosophical
Foundacions (Cambridge U. Press, 1Y98); James Bryce, Conscicucions (Oxford U. Press,
1901); Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds. Conscicucionalism and Democracy (Cambridge
U. Press, 1988); Thomas Grey, Conscicucionalism: An Analycic Framework, in John W.
Chapman and J. Roland Pennock, eds., Nomos XX: Conscicucionalism 189-209 (New
York U. Press, 1979). As should become clear below, I take the wriccen character of constitutional government seriously; I also believe there arc good reasons for distinguishing
between higher (constitutional) and lower (ordinary) legislation, and for conceptualizing
constitutionalism in liberal democratic terms. But my account is meant to be applicable
to a relative diversity of constitutional systems and normative interpretations thereof. My
tendency to rely on U.S. examples is merely an expression of my own limitations, but is
not intended to suggest the superiority of the U.S. status quo. On the contrary, a central
theme of this essay is that the U.S. constitutional system is plagued by major ills. A recent study by Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Conscicutional SelfGovernmem (Yale U. Press, 2001 ), also focuses on the temporal contours of modern constitutionalism. However, Rubenfeld's study neglects the problem of social and economic
acceleration.
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nomic affairs by focusing on their high-speed character. Ours is
an epoch in which social and economic processes are undergoing
a multi-pronged acceleration that raises many difficult questions
for legal scholarship (I). 6 Social and economic acceleration challenges the noble aspiration to establish fundamental constitutional "rules of the game" capable of serving as an effective
binding force on legal and political actors for a relatively long
span of time. Conventional ideas about constitutionalism are
predicated on achieving a modicum of legal constancy and clarity, but this task becomes increasingly difficult in a social world
in which "the rapidity, scope, and intensity" of change becomes
ever more significant (II).
After showing that the recent turn in social theory to provide "conceptual attention to the timing and spacing of human
activities" raises tough questions for constitutionalism, I sketch
the outlines of an institutionally-minded typology of how constitutional systems adapt, albeit typically "by drift and by temporary ... improvisations," to social and economic acceleration. 7
Social and economic acceleration sheds fresh light on traditional
debates about constitutional change. In addition, our high-speed
social and economic environment privileges problematic modes
of constitutional adaptation, thereby threatening the worthy
ideal that fundamental constitutional reform requires substantial
popular participation and deliberation (III). Finally, I conclude
with some tentative suggestions for how we might counteract the
alliance between speed and relatively undemocratic mechanisms
of constitutional change. In order to do so, however, we will
need to rethink temporal assumptions located at the very heart
of modern liberal democracy (IV).
I. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ACCELERATION

Although political and legal scholars have been reluctant to
pick up the baton, social theorists have been busily developing a
perceptive analysis of why the high speed temporal horizons of
social and economic activity are pivotal for understanding our
contemporary situation. In a wide-ranging debate that has en6. This formulation is indebted to Henry Adams, who nearly a century ago diagnosed "a law of social acceleration" in order to make sense of the accelerated tempo of
contemporary life. Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams 489-98 (Houghton
Mifllin, 1918).
7. The first quote is from Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence 12 (U.
of Cal., 1987); the second is from Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action 57 (cited in note
I).
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gaged writers as diverse as Zygmunt Bauman, Anthony Giddens,
David Harvey, Reinhart Koselleck, and Paul Virilio, a consensus
appears to be emerging that ours is a world in which social and
economic processes operate at an ever faster speed, and the
tempo of even relatively significant social and economic change
takes an increasingly rapid pace. 8 To be sure, distinct theoretical
accounts of the institutional roots of the acceleration of social
and economic life, not surprisingly, differ substantially. For example, whereas Giddens and Koselleck have identified a variety
of institutional and conjectural sources for the growing importance of speed in social and economic affairs, others (most
prominently, David Harvey) have tried to locate its origins
chiefly in modern capitalism. For the Marxist Harvey, capitalism
represents
a revolutionary mode of production, always searching out new
organizational forms, new technologies, new lifestyles, new
modalities of production and exploitation and, therefore, new
objective social definitions of time and space .... The turnpikes and canals, the railways, steamships and telegraph, the
radio and automobile, containerization, jet cargo transport,
television and telecommunications, have altered time and
space relations and forced new material practices .... The capacity to measure and divide time has been [constantly] revolutionized, first through the production and diffusion of increasingly accurate time pieces and subsequently through

8. Zygmunt Bauman. Globalization: The Human Consequences 6-26 (Polity,
1998); Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence 173-74 (cited in note 7); David Harvey,
The Condition of Postmodernity 201-326 (Blackwell, 1989); Reinhart Koselleck,
7eitschichten 150-202 (Suhrkamp, 2000); Paul Virilio, Speed & Politics (Semiotcxt, 1986).
For a useful survey of the debate in social theory, sec John Urry, The Sociology of Space
and Time, in Bryan S. Turner, ed., The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory 369-95
(Blackwell, 1996). For two recent attempts to grapple expressly with social and economic
acceleration from the standpoint of legal analysis, sec William E. Scheuerman, Reflexive
Law and the Challenges of Globalization, 9 J. Pol. Phil. 81, 81-102 (2<Xll); William
Scheuerman, Global Law in our High-Speed Economy, in Richard Appelbaum, Wm.
Fclstiner, and Volkmar Gessner, eds., Rules and Networks: The Legal Cullllre of Global
Business Transactions I 03-21 (Hart, 2(Xll ). At least implicitly, the challenges posed by
social and economic acceleration arc addressed as well in the theoretical literature on
statutory lawmaking, where scholars have linked the proliferation of statutes in the twentieth century (as well as the resulting dilemma of statutory obsolescence) to it. For example, Guido Calabresi notes that "the speed with which perceived economic crises have
followed upon economic crises has brought forth legislative responses ... [S]tarting with
the Progressive Era but with increasing rapidity since the New Deal, we have become a
nation governed by written laws" (A Common Law for Statutes 5 (Harvard U. Press,
1982)). If I am not mistaken, many (conceptually underdeveloped) references to what I
am describing here as social and economic acceleration can be found in legal scholarship.
For an excellent general discussion of the nexus between social change and the law, sec
Alan Watson, Society and Legal Change (Scottish Academic Press, 1977).
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close attention to the speed and coordinating mechanisms of
production (automation, robotization) and the speed of
movement of goods, people, information, messages, and the
like. 9

Nonetheless, even those theorists who dispute Harvey's
Marxist account of the origins of social and economic acceleration generally accept his observation that "the history of capitalism has been characterized by a speed-up in the pace of life." 10
Modern capitalism's structurally-rooted drive to reduce turnover
time and accelerate the course of economic life for the sake of
improving profitability undoubtedly constitutes a key feature of
modern economic life; a number of studies-Marxist and otherwise-confirm the existence of an intimate relationship between
capitalism and social and economic acceleration. Making effective use of ever more rapid forms of production and consumption is a proven strategy for business people to maintain profitability and defeat competitors; and capitalism's built-in tendencX
to speed up economic processes manifests itself in myriad ways. 1
The unanswered question in the social theory debate concerns
the precise status of capitalism as a driving force behind social
and economic acceleration, as well as its place as a causal factor
among other institutional facets of modernity that constitute
plausible sources of our high-speed social and economic world.
Yet no serious social analyst questions the view that modern
capitalism plays a significant role in generating pivotal facets of
the "so continual and so intense" change described by Dewey.
The social theory discussion also continues to focus on questions of historical periodization. Most agree that the ascent of
industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century unleashed a particularly intense period of social and economic acceleration,
though some have complicated this widely-endorsed account by
linking social and economic acceleration to features of the modern world that clearly predate industrial capitalism. 12 But the
9.

David Harvey, Justice, Nature & the Geography of Difference 240-41 (Blackwell,

1996).

10. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity 240 (cited in note 8).
II. On the centrality of speed to contemporary economic life, sec James R. Bcnigcr, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information
Society (Harvard U. Press, 1986).
12. E.P. Thompson, Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism, 38 Past and
Present 56, 56-97 (1967). Koselleck underscores key facets of early modern history, including innovations in transportation and communications inspired by mercantilism.
Kosellcck, Zeitschichten at 157-58 (cited in note 8). In some contrast to both Thompson
and Koselleck, the cultural historian Stephen Kern places special emphasis on techno-
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dominant view seems to be that we have experienced a relentless
speed-up of key social and economic processes for well over 150
years now, resulting most immediately from a series of economically-generated technological innovations (including the railroads, telegraphs, airplanes, and computers) that have worked
continuously to alter the temporal contours of social and economic life. Some writers have elaborated on this periodization to
claim that recent decades have exhibited a further intensification
of this long-term trend, as evinced by growing reliance on information and communication technologies that provide economic
actors with dramatically improved opportunities to make use of
simultaneity and instantaneousness. In this vein, Harvey has
tried to demonstrate that economic crises are intimately linked
to relatively intense bouts of social and economic acceleration.
The worldwide economic downturn of the 1970s paved the way
for a reorganization of capitalism in which fresh possibilities for
the successful exploitation of information, communication, and
transportation technologies came to play a crucial role in economic life. Improved rates of commercial and organizational innovation, directly linked to novel technologies (for example,
high-speed computers), constitute core features of a "postFordist" economy that has emerged in the last two decades. For
Harvey, post-Fordism is driven by high-speed technologies that
place a "premium on 'smart' and innovative entrepreneurship,
aided and abetted by all the accouterments of swift, decisive, and
well-informed decision making." 13 Post-Fordism means that the
pace of both everyday economic life and relatively significant
economic innovations is dramatically heightened vis-a-vis earlier
forms of capitalism. According to this account, a privileged
status for speed makes up a permanent attribute of capitalism,
yet acceleration has taken an especially intense form since the
1970s.
This is not the appropriate place for a full-fledged critical
summary of the ongoing social theory debate. For our purposes
here, it suffices to note that participants in the debate are describing a collection of phenomena that can be fruitfully grouped
into three categories. Although the empirical borders between
them are typically blurred, and notwithstanding the fact that all
three "ideal-types" of social and economic acceleration are causlogical innovations that took place at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the
twentieth centuries. Stephen Kern, The Culture of Space and Time, 1880-1918 (Harvard
U. Press, 1983).
13. Harvey, The Conditwn of Postmodernity at 157 (cited in note 8).
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ally interrelated as well (and thus can be plausibly interpreted as
constituting different elements of a single social trend), conceptual clarity demands that we try to distinguish among them. 14
First, we find evidence for an intense process of technological acceleration, according to which key technical processes (particularly in communication, transportation, and production at
large) now take place at a vastly faster pace than in earlier historical periods. Communication transpires between distant geographical points at an unprecedented rate, travel times have
been dramatically cut, and the time necessary for the production
of even relatively complex commodities undergoes constant reduction. Many recent innovations in information technology (for
example, the Internet) constitute obvious examples of this facet
of social and economic speed. Under this rubric we can include
the heightened pace of technological innovation, as the half-life
of many new forms of technology undergoes rapid decline. As
the social philosopher Hans Jonas noted over twenty-five years
ago, technological development in modern times quickly came to
embody "a principle of innovation in itself which made its constant further occurrence mandatory." 15 This type of acceleration
can be measured and quantified with relative ease, and its existence has been documented by many empirical studies. 16
Second, the pace of significant social change or transformation exhibits evidence of acceleration as well. Relatively farreaching shifts in economic and social life now take place at a
rapid pace. Forms of economic organization and occupational
patterns, for example, change intra-generationally rather than
over the course of whole generations. One familiar result of this
alteration in the temporal horizons of social life is that our contemporaries may change jobs many times during the life-course,
whereas our early modern historical predecessors often were
destined to follow occupations identical to those of their parents
and even grandparents. And even those of us who do not shift
jobs are likely to find ourselves in workplace settings where constant organizational restructuring or "rationalization" constitutes
the norm and not the exception. Technological changes can help
14. The tripartite conceptualization that follows is taken directly from Hartmut
Rosa, Temporalstrukwren in der Spaetmoderne: Vom Wunsch nach Beschleunigung und
der Sehnsucht nach Langsamkeit, Handlung, Kulwr, 10:3 Interpretation (2001 ). I am indebted to Rosa's concise discussion of the ongoing debate about the social phenomenon
of speed; his conceptual clarity is something of an exception in the literature.
15. Hans Jonas, Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man 51
(Prentice-Hall, 1974 ).
16. For a superb survey, sec Rosa, 10:3 Interpretation (cited in note 14).
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produce relatively dramatic changes in economic and social organization in a short span of time; within a mere two decades,
new informational technologies have generated far-reaching
shifts in many arenas of contemporary economic production and
consumption. 17 The example of computerization also reminds us
that the process of social change or transformation tends to be
related to technological acceleration. As the pace of technological innovation increases, the rate of major social and economic
change tends to grow as well, as new forms of technology oftentimes, though by no means necessarily, encourage experimentation with novel forms of social and economic organization.
Maybe this is why Dewey could make such an easy transition
from describing the "rapidity, scope, and intensity" of social
change in general to discussing changes in "industrial habits;"
perhaps he understood how the relentless revolutionizing of industrial technologies is often tied to the pace of significant social
and economic change.
Finally, the social and economic acceleration of contemporary society includes the heightened tempo of everyday life, according to which substantial empirical evidence points to an objectively-measurable intensification of activities that we
nowadays engage in during a given unit of time. We eat, walk,
and talk (or at least communicate) faster than most of our
predecessors; we also manage to pull this off even though we
typically sleep less than they did. When Dewey in The Public
and Its Problems alluded to contemporary society's "mania for
motion and speed," it was most likely this facet of our highspeed social and economic world that he had in mind. 18 We
should probably see this final element of acceleration as most directly linked to technological acceleration, which constitutes the
immediate fount for the ever faster pace of everyday life. However, the relative rapidity with which broader social and economic patterns of social life now undergo change may also be
tied to it. In recent years, this third face of speed has attracted
the attention of a number of popular authors, who worry that the
imperatives of an accelerated everyday existence threaten to
overwhelm human capacities for absorbing information and co19
ordinating our lives in a meaningful and coherent manner.
17. Sec Manuel Castclls, The Rise of Network Society (Blackwell, 1996). Sec also
Richard Sennett, The Corrosion of Character: Personal Consequences of Work in the New
Capitalism (W.W. Norton & Co., 1998).
18. John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems 140-41 (Ohio St. U. Press, 1972).
19. Sec, e.g., Jeremy Rifkin, Time Wars: The Primary Conflict in Human History
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II. THE DILEMMA OF CONSTITUTIONAL
OBSOLESCENCE
How then does social and economic acceleration impact on
constitutionalism? Written constitutions represent exacting
forms of prospective lawmaking, according to which constitutionmakers are asked to foresee future social and economic trends in
order to funnel the operations of state power as effectively as
possible. Of course, ordinary legislators are also asked to predict
social patterns. Distinctive about written constitutions is that
their architects typically aspire to do so for "an indefinite but
presumably long future," however. 20 Statutes may require relatively frequent alteration or fall into disuse, as evinced by the
growing reliance on sunset laws and other devices that implicitly
concede their limited half-life. 21 But constitutional lawmakers
traditionally are expected to achieve stable "rules of the game"
well-suited to myriad future settings. John Locke, one of the intellectual forces behind modern liberal constitutionalism, went
so far as to argue that the "fundamental Constitutions of Carolina" should "remain the sacred and unalterable form and rule of
government of Carolina for ever," and anyone who peruses
Locke's "fundamental Constitutions" will search in vain for
amendment procedures. 22
Later generations modified Locke's extreme notion of an
unalterable constitution and also challenged his apparent preference for a detailed, code-like constitutional document. 23 At least
since 1789, many written constitutions have contained relatively
abstract language ("due process," for example, or "cruel and unusual punishment"), and this innovation has served as a usetul
mechanism for constitutional architects struggling to achieve a
successful legally-binding set of norms able to guide future generations. In the U.S. case, as in many others, "[t]he very language of the Constitution suggests that the Framers ... recognized that the Constitution is . . . a majestic charter for
government, intended to govern for ages to come and to apply to
both unforeseen and unforeseeable circumstances." 24 Nonetheless, constitutional lawmakers are still expected to possess im(Henry Holt, 1987).
20. Kay, 13 Ratio Juris at33 (cited in note 4).
21. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes at59-65 (cited in note 8).
22. John Locke, Fundamental Constitutions for Carolina, in David Wootton, ed.,
Political Writings of John Locke 232 (Mentor, 1993).
23. Locke's Fundamental Constitlllions for Carolina is lengthy and detailed.
24. Stephen Macedo, The New Right v. The Constitution 18 (Cato Institute, 1986).
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pressive powers of foresight. Even the most elastic constitutional
language is supposed to help guide and bind the activities of subsequent political and legal actors, though the task at hand then
inevitably takes on additional difficulty.
Social and economic acceleration conflicts with the traditional expectation that constitutional lawmakers can be expected
to predict future trends with some measure of competence. The
foresight of even the most adept constitutional architect suffers
in the context of an environment subject to the dictates of speed,
as the scope of "both unforeseen and unforeseeable circumstances" expands dramatically. The half-life of every original
constitutional agreement is subject to decay in a social and economic environment where "so continual and so intense" change
becomes pervasive. Rapid changes in the social and economic
circumstances inevitably presupposed by even the most farsighted constitutional lawmakers exacerbate the hardships of
their already difficult tasks. Not even abstract language appropriate to its status as a "majestic charter" can circumvent the necessity of fundamentally updating the constitution in order to adjust to social and economic change. As the legal scholar Richard
Kay rightly notes, "lh]uman history tells us that sooner or later
every constitution will begin to chafe," and fundamental departures from an original constitutional agreement inevitably occur.25 At some juncture, an unmistakable "misalignment between the constitution and the social and political realities which
any system of government must take into account" appears; even
the most pliable constitutional language will need to take on
novel and unexpected meanings in order to allow for fundamental ruptures with the constitutional status quo. 26 Social and economic acceleration provides the dilemma of constitutional obsolescence with special significance. Recall from our discussion
above that core facets of social and economic acceleration include the intensification of technological innovation, as well as
the closely-related process whereby broader patterns of social
and economic life (occupational patterns, for example, or workplace organization) now undergo relatively rapid transformations. Any constitutional system that intends to employ state authority effectively for the sake of grappling with social and
economic life faces the problem that constitutional lawmakers,
to a decreasing degree, can realistically succeed in anticipating

25.
26.

Kay, 13 Ratio Juris at 41 (cited in note 4).
Id.
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the vast unprecedented changes likely to confront future generations. In relatively static social and economic settings, the specter
of constitutional obsolescence typically remained distant; perhaps this is why Enlightenment political and legal thinkers like
Locke tended to conceive of written constitutions as fundamentally timeless documents, unlikely to require amendment or alteration. Like so many other features of our high-speed world,
however, constitutions risk becoming "out of date" at an ever
faster rate. No constitution can remain unchanged for long in a
world where "[a]ll fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of
ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away,
all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify.
All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned .... " 17
If the diagnosis described in the first part of this essay is correct, social and economic acceleration also includes the heightened frequency of relatively substantial forms of social and economic change: We now find ourselves in a social and economic
world where far-reaching transformations occur at a rapid-fire
pace. Thus, the enigma at hand is not merely that we require
constitutional systems to provide a modicum of flexibility so that
future generations can tinker with their basic structure in order
to adapt to minimal forms of social change. Instead, constitutions must accommodate frequent and relatively far-reaching social and economic transformations. Yet fundamental social
changes are likely to require no less frequent shifts in many areas of constitutional practice. Just as alterations in the assumptions about factual social and economic circumstances underlying any given statute threaten to render it obsolescent,28 so too
does the dramatically heightened pace of change in core features
of social and economic life suggest an increased possibility of
constitutional obsolescence. Every constitutional system is intimately intermeshed with the course of social and economic life,
and the acceleration of the latter requires adaptation by the former. As Martin J. Sklar points out, law "is not some 'reflection'
of, or 'superstructure' hovering above, capitalist property and
market relations; it is an essential mode of existence ... of those
relations. When those relations are undergoing substantial
change, so will the law .... " 29 As the pace of social and economic
27. Friedrich Engels to Karl Marx, ManifesiO of the Communist Party, in Robert C.
Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader469 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1972).
28. Cass R. Sunstcin, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulawry State
174-75 (Harvard U. Press, 1990).
29. Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890-
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activity accelerates, so too does the tempo of legal change. Thus,
the traditional question of constitutional change necessarily takes
on greater significance than traditional liberal democratic theory
anticipated. Social and economic acceleration implies the necessity of a relatively dynamic mode of constitutionalism able to
adapt to "so continual and so intense" social and economic
change. 30
In the following section, I outline various paths by which
constitutional systems struggle to deal with the difficulty of adjusting to a high-speed world. Before doing so, we need to be
clear about the fundamental tensions at hand. Constitutional
lawmakers are supposed to achieve a relatively coherent document able to provide a basis for some, however minimal, measures of constancy and clarity in the law. For the moment, we can
bracket the difficult questions of how much constancy or clarity
is required, the appropriate legal character that they should take,
as well as their substantive aims and goals. Nonetheless, the very
idea of a written constitution is predicated on the idea that its
norms should bind and thereby coordinate social and political
actors with some degree of constancy if they are to serve as a
meaningful source for a standing body of jurisprudence concerned with the fundamental "rules of the game." Acknowledging this point hardl~ requires fidelity to an overly cramped brand
of legal formalism. 1 Written constitutions are also conceived as
cogent public statements providing "fair warning" and orientation to political and legal actors about the basics of political life.
Although himself an admirer of the "unwritten" British constitution, even James Bryce conceded that written constitutions were
1916 at 89 (Cambridge U. Press, 1988). Historical support for this general claim is amply
provided by Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in American History (Oxford U.
Press, 1989) and Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (Simon & Schuster, 2nd. ed.,1985).
30. This conclusion overlaps with James Tully's call for a dynamic mode of constitutionalism, though I worry about preserving traditional liberal-democratic legal virtues to
a greater extent than Tully. See James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an
Age of Diversity (Cambridge U. Press, 1995).
31. Dewey acknowledged this point, when he referred to the "undoubted need for
the maximum possibility of stability and regularity of expectation" in the law (Logical
Method and Law (1924), in Wiliam W. Fisher, et al., eds., American Legal Realism 191
(Oxford U. Press, 1993)). For a balanced discussion of the merits (and also limits) of constancy and clarity in the law, see Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 63-65, 79-81 (Yale
U. Press, 1964). Only extreme views of legal indeterminacy are inconsistent with my attempt to take the notion of a written constitution, as well as the traditional legal virtues
of constancy and clarity, seriously. For a critique of such views, sec Lawrence B. Solum,
On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 462, 462-503
(1987).
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better attuned to the democratic temper of contemporary life:
"the democratic man ... is pleased to read and know his Constitution for himself. The more plain and straightforward it is the
better. ... " 32
Without presupposing some version of these conventional
ideas, it becomes unclear why we need written constitutions in
the first place. Alas, contemporary conditions require constitutions exhibiting enormous flexibility; they now must leave room
for a vast and constantly expanding range of novel social and
economic experiences, many of which are likely to prove momentous. Although social and economic acceleration thus calls
for heightened constitutional adaptability, it is by no means selfevident how we can simultaneously achieve a sufficient dose of
constancy and clarity in constitutional law. A permanently altering, highly adaptable constitutional system risks opening the
door to legal inconstancy and opaqueness. Two rejoinders come
immediately to mind: First, it might seem as though the specter
of constitutional obsolescence should only concern systems dedicated to the pursuit of expansive forms of state activity in the
economy. Constitutions based on "free market" or laissez-faire
ideals might be relatively immune to constitutional obsolescence
to the extent that they are less committed to regulating fastpaced forms of social and economic activity, and thus would be
less subject, for example, to the impermanence of our high-speed
capitalist economy. Their half-life would remain relatively substantial. This argument gains some initial empirical support from
the fact that constitutional systems expressly supportive of farreaching state intervention in the economy are precisely those
where the problem of obsolescent norms and clauses has long
been most intensely discussed. For example, U.S. state constitutions provided a legal framework for active intervention relatively early on (that is, by the mid-nineteenth century). Yet an
impressive body of scholarship suggests that the easy amendability of state constitutions burdened them with detailed norms
concerning state economic intervention, many of which (for example, specific provisions concerning railroads and the nittygritty of commerce and trade) soon were out of date. 33 Nonethe32. Bryce, Constitutions at80 (cited in note 5).
33. For some of the details, sec Albert L. Sturm, The Development of American
State Constitutions, 12 Publius 57, 57-98 (1982); see also John Dinan, 'The Earth Belongs
Always to the Living Generation': The Development of State Constitutional Amendment
and Revision Procedures, 62 Rev. of Pol. 645, 645-74 (2000); Donald S. Lutz, Toward a
Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in Sanford Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitwional Amendment 237-74 (Princeton U. Press,
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less, this rejoinder is unconvincing. Constitutional systems committed to free market ideals also require adaptation to the everchanging contours of social and economic change. Governments
committed to free market policies engage in significant forms of
state activity in economic and social affairs, as demonstrated by
the examples of Thatcher's Great Britain and Pinochet's Chile.
Even a diehard libertarian judge who pursues free market interpretations of a specific constitutional clause (for example, due
process) will find herself forced to adapt the clause to social and
economic change, and she is likely to engage in a series of creative reinterpretations in order to assure its relevance to the
breakneck pace of social and economic life. Laissez-faire constitutional systems operate within, and thus must react to, the challenges of social and economic acceleration, no less than constitutional systems committed to the welfare and regulatory states. 34
Second, perhaps we should see constitutions as expressive
of a broadly-defined set of abstract moral principles, along the
lines proposed by Ronald Dworkin and others who have taken
seriously the fact that written constitutions often consist of openended, moralistic clauses strikingly different from the code-like
general rules favored by defenders of a traditional model of legality.35 From this perspective, founding fathers (and mothers)
simply do not intend their offspring to be interpreted in the same
way as conventional legal rules or statutes. The argument presented above fails to do justice to the special features of constitutional law. Constitutions should be read as elastic "living" documents, offering statements of abstract principle that should
prove relatively immune to changing social and economic conditions. For sure, the ban on "cruel and unusual punishment" may
imply a different set of concrete legal answers in 2089 than 1789,
yet at the level of abstract principle, "cruel and unusual punishment" possesses a sufficient degree of moral and legal coherence
and stability according to which constitutions can maintain the
requisite measures of constancy and clarity over time. From this
perspective, the dilemma of social and economic acceleration
turns out to be a pseudo-problem since constitutions consist of

1995).
34. This rejoinder is inspired by the provocative reflections of Stephen Griffin, who
attributes many of the problematic facets of recent U.S. constitutional development to
the emergence of the interventionist and welfare states. Stephen M. Griffin, American
Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics (Princeton U. Press, 1996).
35. For Dworkin's distinction between rules and principles, see his Taking Rights
Seriously (Harvard U. Press, 1977).
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abstract principles able to guarantee their identity and legally
binding force for "an indefinite but presumably long future."
Even if we concede the controversial view that we should
read constitutions as embodying abstract moral principles, however, the phenomenon of temporal acceleration can hardly be
disposed of so quickly. At the very least, social and economic acceleration implies that interpretations of abstract constitutional
principles will be forced to change at a no less high speed rate
than social and economic life itself. The intensified rate of technological change, for example, points to the likelihood of regularly reinterpreting what "cruel and unusual punishment" means
in policy and legal terms. In a similar vein, the legal implications
of a constitutional "right to privacy" will probably have to be revised in the face of permanent innovation in information technology. From the bird's eye view of the legal or moral philosopher, "cruel and unusual punishment" or the "right to privacy"
may seem to embody relatively constant principles; from the
perspective of the legal or political actor "on the ground," the
necessity of constantly reinterpreting them represents the more
noteworthy facet of the enigma at hand. Social and economic acceleration seems to require a speed-up of the process by which
constitutional norms undergo reinterpretation probably no less
intense than the general acceleration in social and economic affairs at large.
At some point constitutional interpretation shades off into
fundamental constitutional alteration. Even the most abstract
constitutional principle forecloses some set of imaginable interpretations, and one hardly must endorse an unduly narrow
model of legal interpretation in order to recognize the virtue of
maintaining a distinction between the interpretation of a preexisting constitutional principle and the invention or creation of a
new one. Moreover, we can readily concede that the line between constitutional interpretation and alteration is hard to draw
in legal praxis, while maintaining that there are good normative
and institutional reasons for preserving it. We can also admit
that there are legitimate differences of opinion about the best
theoretical account of the distinction between interpretation and
alteration. Nonetheless, formal constitutional amendment procedures presuppose the possibility of drawing a distinction between constitutional interpretation and modification. Stripped of
this distinction, the constitutional commitment to formal
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amendment- a core feature of most constitutional systemsmakes no sense. 36
As noted above, social and economic acceleration heightens
the need for relatively frequent fundamental constitutional
change. The breakneck pace of major social and economic transformation means that the imperatives of constitutional change
increasingly tend to explode the confines of legal interpretation.
Abstract constitutional principles will have to undergo relatively
frequent fundamental alteration in order to adapt effectively.
Judicial actors who adjust constitutional norms to novel social
conditions may claim that their decisions represent examples of
"mere" legal interpretation. A closer examination, however, is
likely to reveal that their rulings often entail fundamental constitutional alteration.
This is no mere thought-experiment. It is now something of
a cliche among scholars that constitutional courts periodically
engage in constitutional lawmaking nearly as ambitious as the
original act of constitutional founding. Under the auspices of interpreting Articles Four and Five, many dramatic twists and
turns have occurred in the fundamental understanding of criminal procedure, in part as responses to rapidly changing social
conditions. The open-ended "underlying focus of the law" in this
arena, namely "the idea that the Constitution places great value
on one's ability to keep information out of the government's
hands," has been subject to a rich diversity of restatements, and
a careful analysis of the jurisprudence of Articles Four and Five
belies robust claims about their purported constancy over time. 37

36. Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been
Amended? (A) <.26; (B) 26; (c) 27; (D)>27: Accounting for Constitutional Change, in Levinson, cd., Responding to Imperfection 14-24 (cited in note 33). Levinson offers an excellent starting point for developing a conceptual account of how we might delineate constitutional interpretation from constitutional alteration: the former is "linked in specifiable
ways to analyses of the text or at least to the body of materials conventionally regarded
as within the ambit of the committed constitutionalist," whereas the latter "signifies
something out the ordinary, something truly new." Id. at 15. The distinction between interpretation and alteration introduced here also overlaps somewhat with Joseph Raz's
delineation of "conserving" from "innovatory" constitutional interpretation (On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions, in Alexander, Constitutionalism at 182 (cited
in note 5)).
37. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 Yale L. J.
393, 395 (1995). As Stuntz notes, "the substantive issues that shaped Fourth and Fifth
Amendment law arc long since settled .... We have taken a privacy ideal formed in heresy cases and railroad regulation disputes, an ideal that had no connection to ordinary
criminal law enforcement, and used it as the foundation for much of the vast body of law
that polices the police. Predictably, the combination has not worked out very well." ld. at
396
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Some constitutional courts undertake what Robert Lipkin
bluntly but aptly describes as "revolutionary adjudication," in
which judges engage in fundamental reinterpretations of the basic constitutional "rules of the game" so as to alter core elements
of the political system's legal and political identity. 38 Constitutional courts take on the authority of the constituent power by
initiating ambitious forms of fundamental constitutional alteration. Traditional (oftentimes politically conservative) legal
commentators typically attribute the exercise of the constituent
power by courts to power-hungry judges, or the endorsement of
problematic models of flexible legal interpretation. 39 From the
vantage point of the diagnosis developed here, however, matters
look more complicated. Whatever its normative and legal faults,
the universal tendency for powerful courts to undertake frequent
constitutional alteration represents a practical adaptation to a
fundamental institutional dilemma: How can we achieve the frequent constitutional change called for by the breakneck pace of
social and economic acceleration?
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION IN AN AGE OF
SPEED
Activist constitutional courts represent only one possible institutional adaptation to social and economic acceleration. In
this section, I offer a preliminary typology of constitutional
change, oriented towards demonstrating that the experience of
social and economic acceleration provides a starting point for
making sense of some of its most widely-discussed dilemmas. 40
Social and economic acceleration also helps us conceptualize
38. Robert Justin Lipkin, The Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions, 68 Ncb. L.
Rev. 701,701-806 (1989). It has become relatively commonplace to point out that constitutional courts often operate as the constituent or constitution-making power. For an excellent discussion of this trend and its implications for institutional reform, see Andrew
Arata, The New Democracies and American Constitutional Design, 7 Constellations 333
(2000).
39. In this vein, Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the
Law 47 (Princeton U. Press, 1997).
40. Cass Sunstein points out that statutory obsolescence rests on various sources,
including the possibility that "a statutory provision may no longer be consistent with
widely held social norms," and "the legal background [to a particular statute] may have
changed dramatically as a result of legislative and judicial innovations." Sunstein, After
the Rights Revolution at 174 (cited in note 28). Similarly, constitutional obsolescence undoubtedly has diverse roots. Nonetheless, the phenomenon of social and economic acceleration makes up an important source of the problem, and thus my emphasis on it here.
What Sunstein describes as changing "factual assumptions" underlying an original legal
norm (for example, the introduction of new technology) is contained in the notion of social and economic acceleration as used here.
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enigmas whose existence hitherto has only been vaguely appreciated. Most important, it underscores the existence of a paradox
at the very heart of contemporary constitutionalism. Social and
economic speed risks favoring insufficiently democratic mechanisms for constitutional adaptation. Relatively democratic
modes of constitutional change appear to mesh poorly with the
imperatives of social and economic acceleration, thereby potentially robbing constitutionalism of the democratic legitimacy
which its most persuasive defenders rightly consider indispensable. The most well-trodden paths of constitutional change have
entailed institutional adaptation primarily via (A) the "dualistic"
system of formal amendment initiated by the U.S. founders, (B)
courts, (C) legislatures (most famously, the U.K. system of constitutional reform via parliamentary statute), and (D) the executive.41
(A) Bruce Ackerman has recently reminded us of what arguably was the greatest invention of the U.S. framers, namely a
system of constitutional dualism in which the activities of "ordinary" lawmaking are separated from "higher" constitutional legislation. In this view, the U.S. founders rightly abandoned
Locke's notion of a basically unalterable constitution, but they
simultaneously insisted that fundamental constitutional reform
would be required to take an arduous and time-consuming
path. 42 In the U.S. system, higher legislation involves making
41. One might also add a further option to this list, namely the possibility that
popular revolution is the only appropriate response to the inevitable decay of all constitutions. During the U.S. Revolution, some radical republicans endorsed this approach.
Michael Liencsch, New Order of the Ages: Time, the Constitution, and the Making of
Modern American Political Thought 67 (Princeton U. Press, 1988). I neglect it here for
the reason that social and economic acceleration suggests that revolutions of this type
would have to be a more-or-less permanent affair, given the intense pace of social change
and the necessity of frequent constitutional adaptation and revision. Surely, no defender
of liberal-democratic constitutionalism wants permanent revolution. Two additional caveats should be kept in mind. First, constitutional change always involves a variety of
institutional and political actors, and any conceptual typology risks obscuring the messy
empirical realities of constitutional change. The typology offered here (inspired by Albert L. Sturm, Thirty Years of State Constitution-Making 18 (National Municipal League,
1970)) aims at underscoring the fundamental institutional and normative challenges
posed by the necessity of a relatively dynamic mode of constitutional adaptation. Second,
the social theory debate suggests that social and economic acceleration represents a longterm (that is, since the industrial revolution) process, but also that the speed-up of social
and economic life continues to intensify. Although I cannot adequately demonstrate this
empirical claim here, this leads me to believe that the dilemmas posed by social and economic acceleration for constitutionalism have increased in the last century and are likely
to continue to so in the future.
42. For the historical and philosophical background, see Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995 at 19-109 (cited in note 3); Vile,
The Constitutional Amending Process in American Political Thought at 23-78 (cited in
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"supreme law in the name of the People," and it does so by assuring a greater level of democratic legitimacy than typically
found in the ordinary course of political decision making. Constitutional reform should not take place at the level of everyday
politics, because the heightened democratic legitimacy required
for constitutional lawmaking simply cannot be demonstrated by
an electoral victory, for example, or the domination of one
branch of the government by a single political party or candidate. In order for constitutional change to be legitimate, it "must
take to the specially onerous obstacle course provided by a dualist Constitution for purposes of higher lawmaking," 43 since the
U.S. founders believed that fundamental change to the constitutional system should exhibit a high degree of popular consensus.
For this reason, they placed enormous burdens on the process of
formal constitutional amendment: Future generations would be
permitted to alter the original constitutional compact, but they
note 2). The procedural core of Article V reads as follows:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress.
U.S. Const., Art. V.
Notwithstanding its seeming clarity, Article V continues to inspired heated disagreements. See Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment
as well as Walter F. Murphy, Merlin's Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of the
Once and Future Polity, both in Levinson, cd., Responding to Imperfection at 89-115, 16390 (cited in note 33); Frank I. Michelman, Thirteen Easy Pieces, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1297,
1297-1332 (1994).
43. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 6 (Harvard U. Press, 1991). Ackerman's views have generated a wide-ranging debate which, unfortunately, I cannot discuss here. See Andrew Arata, Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy (Rowman &
Littlefield, 2000); see also 104 Ethics No. 3 April, 1994 (a special issue devoted to Ackerman's work). For now, let me just say that I find the outlines of Ackerman's model of
constitutional dualism appealing, especially Arata's insight that there are "important rcasons why constitutional politics can and therefore should involve a wider and more democratic form of participation than normal politics." Arata, Civil Society, Constitution,
and Legitimacy at 135-38. Nonetheless, there are many reasons for criticizing Ackerman's own defense of the manner in which constitutional dualism in the U.S. has taken
unexpected institutional paths. We need to separate Ackerman's core intuitions about
constitutional dualism from the particular form it has taken in the U.S. The latter has
been more problematic than Ackerman concedes. Like Arato, I am more skeptical than
Ackerman of constitutional adaptation "outside of legality," and my discussion here presupposes a normatively and institutionally more appreciative view of legal paths to constitutional change. Arato, Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy at xiv. Of course,
my sympathy for Ackerman's position raises fundamental normative questions about the
relationship between democratic legitimacy and the idea of dualist constitutionalism. Unfortunately, I cannot address those questions here, though I should note that Arata's
study docs a fine job investigating many of them.
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would have to do so in accordance with the tough procedures
outlined in Article V.
Not only does constitutional dualism minimize the perils of
leaving the authority to change the fundamental "rules of the
game" to those immediately involved in the political game (for
example, legislators), but it is simply mistaken to assert "that the
winner of a fair and open election is entitled to rule with the full
authority of We The People." 44 No single institution (Congress,
for example, or the executive) can legitimately claim to speak for
"the people" as a whole, and we can only reasonably determine
that a proposed change to the constitutional system possesses
the requisite democratic legitimacy if it has successfully withstood a lengthy series of institutional tests. Of course, alternative
liberal democratic models of constitutional change also presuppose that fundamental constitutional change should rest on a
high degree of democratic legitimacy. But special about the U.S.
innovation is the intuition that the achievement of a sufficient
democratic basis for constitutional reform presupposes a relatively lengthy period of intense political debate and mobilization, as well as 1) express support from a broad range of political
institutions, and 2) passage of a series of time-consuming institutional tests in order to assure that popular support for constitutional amendment is sufficiently deliberate and well-considered.
Unfortunately, social and economic acceleration defies the
temporal preconditions of this admirable vision of constitutional
reform. A key "desideratum" of higher lawmaking is that "it
proceed slowly and deliberately," and the toilsome procedures
of Article V were clearly intended by the framers to decelerate
popular debate and exchange in order to assure its reasonable
character. 45 They envisioned Article Vas requiring that constitu44. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations at 9 (cited in note 43).
45. David R. Dow, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in Levinson, ed., Responding to
Imperfection at 128 (cited in note 33); sec also DonaldS. Lutz, Toward a Constitutional
Amendment in Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection at 239 (cited in note 33). The
inflexibility of Article V in part derives from the fact that the founders may have been
closer to Locke's notion of an "unalterable" constitution than many modern commentators acknowledge. Philip Hamburger has argued plausibly that the founders were deeply
hostile to constitutional change, tending to envision Article V as a device for completing
or perfecting what they conceived as a fundamentally timeless doctrine. By no means did
they picture Article V as an instrument for adapting the constitution to social and economic change. Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitutions's Accommodation of Social
Change, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 239, 301 (1988). Morton Horwitz has also emphasized that the
U.S. Constitution was long conceived as a fundamentally immutable document; only in
the twentieth century was this view subjected to major criticism. Morton J. Horowitz,
Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism,
107 Harv. L. Rev. 30,30-117 (1993).
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tiona! reform would be subject to a series of temporally drawnout institutional checks, in part because they believed that the
reasonableness of popular debate and exchange could only be
achieved by guaranteeing that it offered a fair hearing to a rich
diversity of views, as well as a meaningful opportunity to acknowledge the pluralism of interests found in modern society.
Practiced in anything more than a small group, however, this
meant that deliberation would have to be a slow-going affair. 46
Within the U.S. system, the process of ordinary legislation thus
includes a number of mechanisms (bicameralism, for example,
and the executive veto) aimed in part at decelerating decision
making and thereby contributing to its deliberative merits. 47
From the perspective of the founders, it made no less sense to
create amendment procedures significantly more complex and
time-consuming than the rules of everyday legislative politics.
How better to assure the correspondingly higher level of reasonable democratic consensus called for by the vastly weightier
tasks of higher lawmaking than by dramatically decelerating the
process of constitutional change via cumbersome obstacles to
formal amendment?
The result of the founders' reflections was a system of
amendment now widely seen as one of the most slow-going in
the world. 48 The framers were so effective at decelerating constitutional reform via formal amendment that they arguably helped
paralyze the U.S. system of formal amendment altogether; a vast
range of scholarly studies describes the virtual impossibility of

46. For example, note Madison's famous claim in Federalist 10 that in a large republic, "communication is always checked" (or slowed-down), which presumably should contribute to the reasonable character of popular deliberation in the proposed American
republic. Excessive speed in popular debate, it seems, is not conducive to well-considered
outcomes. Federalist 10 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 83
(Mentor, 1961 ).
47. For David Hume, for example, bicameralism represented an instrument for
preventing a "mere mob" from being easily influenced, and thus a way to help assure
well-considered legislative decisions. David Hum.:, Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, in
Hume, Political Essays 153 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1953). More generally on the role of institutional design in "cooling" (and decelerating) popular deliberation, sec Cass Sunstein,
republic.com 38-39 (Princeton U. Press, 2001).
48. Article V allows as few as thirteen of ninety-nine state legislative bodies to defeat the ratification of a proposed amendment, and "[t]he requirement for such extraordinary majorities means that, in the case of structural amendments, any significant political bloc possesses an effective veto." James L. Sundquist, Constitutional Reform and
Effective Government 17 (The Brookings Institution, 1992). For an empirical demonstration of the enormous obstacles created by Article V, sec Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection at 237 (cited in note
33).
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undertaking meaningful institutional reform via Article V. 49 The
diagnosis of contemporary society outlined above helps shed
fresh light on this familiar quagmire. Social and economic acceleration implies that the amendment procedures of Article V increasingly have operated in the context of a social and economic
universe characterized by rapid-fire change and innovation. Our
high-speed social and economic world conflicts with the timeconsuming procedures outlined in Article V, generating a misfit
between the temporal horizons of formal constitutional amendment and social and economic affairs. Of course, much of the existing critical literature on Article V laments its laggard character. What that literature obscures is that "slowness" per se is no
failing, particularly in a system of constitutional dualism where
deliberateness is indispensable to higher lawmaking. Indeed, for
the U.S. founders as for the mainstream of Enlightenment political thought, slowness was generally a virtue to be aspired for in
popular deliberation, whereas rapidity in mass politics typicallsb
could be taken as prima facie evidence of its irrationality. 0
Slowness only becomes a handicap in a social and economic
world where speed is at a premium, and social change takes
places at an ever more intense pace.
Not surprising, the deliberate process of democratic constitutional reform outlined by Article V has suffered from neglect.51 Social and economic acceleration means that political actors repeatedly find themselves forced to adapt the
constitutional system to incessant and oftentimes substantial social and economic change, and the procedures of Article V understandably appear to strike many of them as little more than a
quaint leftover from a simpler world fundamentally irrelevant to
the real-life institutional tasks of contemporary politics. Accord49. This is a theme of many of the essays collected in Levinson, ed., Responding to
Imperfection (cited in note 33). The rigidity of Article V was anticipated by some of the
Anti-Federalists, Federal Fanner, Leuer IV, in Herbert J. Storing, ed., The Complete
Anti-Federalist: Writings by Opponents of the Constitution 59-60 (U. Chicago Press,
1981 ).
50. In this vein, recall again Madison's hope that a large republic would "check" (or
decelerate) mass debate, thereby contributing to its reasonableness, as well as Locke's
famous discussion of the "dissolution of government" in the Second Treatise, where he
suggests that revolutionary politics is only well-considered after a tyrannized people has
patiently tolerated a "long train of abuses." Patience and even procrastination are essential preconditions of reasonable popular deliberation John Locke, Second Treatise in Two
Treatises of Government 'I 223 (Cambridge U. Press, 1988).
51. Again, see the essays collected in Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection
(cited in note 33). Revealingly, the most important amendments (XIII-XV) were ap·
proved during the Reconstruction period, and were arguably forced upon the southern
states by northern bayonets and rifles.

2002] CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF SPEED

375

ingly, some of the most blunt assessments of the temporal misfit
between Article V and contemporary society have come from
perceptive politicians. During the heyday of the New Deal, proposals to pursue a formal amendment in order to establish a
sturdy constitutional basis for the emerging welfare state generated a terse response from President Roosevelt: referring to the
lengthy time period it would surely take to alter the constitution,
Roosevelt seems to have anticipated the temporal flaws of Article V when he announced, "We can no longer afford the luxury
of twenty-year lags. " 52 Why waste scarce political energy on a
fight for a formal amendment whose advantages might only accrue decades down the road?
To be sure, Article V outlines an unusually laborious set of
amendment procedures, and the fundamental core of constitutional dualism is undoubtedly consistent with somewhat less
time-consuming methods of formal amendment. As we will see,
Ackerman and others have proposed substantial modifications
to Article V which nonetheless would preserve constitutional
dualism. By the same token, it would be a mistake simply to
chalk up the temporal misfit between formal constitutional
amendment and contemporary society to the idiosyncrasies of
the U.S. Constitution, or to suggest that alternative systems for
formal amendment might easily overcome the dilemmas posed
by social and economic acceleration. Social and economic acceleration implies that every system of formal amendment resting
on dualistic constitutional principles, and thus committed to
broad-based, time-consuming popular deliberation via lengthy
institutional tests, is likely to find itself forced to deal with the
temporal misfit described above. To the extent that contemporary society also evinces a built-in intensification of social and
economic acceleration, even those constitutional systems possessing amendment procedures significantly less cumbersome
than Article V may be destined to struggle, to an increasing degree, with problems akin to those which have long plagued constitutional adaptation in the United States.
Perhaps this is why there has not only been a significant revival of scholarly interest in the question of constitutional
change, but also why so many legal scholars today seem unconvinced that any formal amendment could ever serve as an ade-

52. Kyvig, Explicit and Awhentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995
at 306 (cited in note 3) (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses 4
(Randon House, 1938).
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quate device for achieving peaceful constitutional change. 53 At
the very least, social and economic acceleration raises difficult
questions for those of us sympathetic to the worthy liberal democratic ideal that constitutional adaptation via formal amendment not only should take a deeply democratic form, but that we
need to assure its deliberate and well-considered character by
means of time-consuming institutional tests.
(B) Courts also update the constitutional system in accordance with changing social and economic realities. As noted
above, social and economic acceleration implies the necessity of
continuously reinterpreting constitutional norms, as well as frequent alterations to key elements of the constitutional system.
Not only does social and economic acceleration thereby help
muddy any real-life border we might draw between "law" and
"politics," but constitutional courts also will probably tend to
modify the constitution and take on the role of stealth constituent power. 54 The U.S. innovation of judicial review has provided
institutional possibilities for constitutional change which undoubtedly would have surprised the founders: U.S. Supreme
Court decisions often have impacted more profoundly on the
fundamental operations of the political system than many of the
formal amendments achieved via Article V. 55
In 1921, Justice Cardozo captured the underlying rationale
for this path to constitutional change when he observed that in
contemporary society "[n]othing is stable. Nothing absolute. All
is fluid and changeable. We are back with Heraclitus." 56 For
Cardozo, the "perpetual flux" of social and economic relations
defies formalistic modes of constitutional exegesis. Jurists would
do well to offer a "more plastic, more malleable" reading of the
53. Griffin notes that "constitutional scholars have become increasingly aware of
the importance of developing a theory of constitutional change." Griffin, American Constitutionalism at 10 (cited in note 34). A revealing illustration of the pervasive skepticism
towards formal amendment found among contemporary (especially left-liberal) legal
scholars is a lengthy article by Morton Horwitz on constitutional change in one of the
nation's premier legal reviews, where formal amendment is ignored altogether.
Horowitz, 107 Harv. L. Rev. at 30-117 (cited in note 45). Of course, this neglect contains
a certain amount of plausibility if one endorses the radical notions of legal indeterminacy
(occasionally) embraced by Horwitz.
54. The distinction between constitutional interpretation and constitutional alteration introduced above might be taken as one way by which we might delineate law (interpretation) from politics (alteration). Of course, any attempt to salvage this distinction
entails complex issues than I am unable to address in the confines of this essay.
55. For a slew of plausible examples, see Lipkin, 68 Neb. L. Rev. at 734-39 (cited in
note 38).
56. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 28 (Yale U. Press,
1921).
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U.S. Constitution in order to guarantee its relevance to the
changing exigencies of the times. 57 Judges should minimize the
impact of precedent in order to allow themselves room for creative readings of the law; the fidelity to the past intrinsic to stare
decisis decreasingly makes sense given the profound fluidity and
alterability of twentieth-century social and economic affairs.
A few decades earlier, astute observers of the U.S. system
had already attributed the growing tendency among American
jurists to engage in creative constitutional interpretation to the
weaknesses of Article V. In his influential essay on "Flexible and
Rigid Constitutions," Bryce grouped the U.S. under the latter
rubric, arguing that American judges often aspired to overcome
the problem of constitutional rigidity, deriving in part from Article V, by pursuing open-ended interpretations of constitutional
law that their more formalistic British legal peers found shocking. The case of the American Republic suggested that rigidity in
formal amendment procedures might be compensated for by
flexibility within constitutional exegesis. 58
From the perspective of social and economic acceleration,
constitutional adaptation via judicial interpretation exhibits a
number of advantages vis-a-vis formal amendment. It allows for
the recurrent reinterpretation of constitutional norms; since
many of those reinterpretations do not possess the status of fundamental modifications or alterations to the constitution, this
practice performs a vital function for a political system faced
with "so continual and so intense" change. By not burdening
constitutional adaptation with the time-consuming procedures
called for by formal constitutional amendments, flexible comtitutional exegesis permits courts to respond more quickly to
many difficult constitutional conflicts. To be sure, decision making by higher courts is hardly a paragon of speed or efficiency,
and their deliberate character is guaranteed by a slow-going
57. Id. at 161. Jerome Frank similarly observed that "we have practically insisted on
a flexible construction of its words to permit of the legalization of social changes which
were never contemplated by our forefathers who drafted and adopted the sacred instrument" of the U.S. Constitution. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 300 (Doubleday, 1930). There are reasons for suspecting that the U.S. founders would have been
skeptical of the trend towards court-based constitutional adaptation via flexible exegesis.
See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment 363-64, 377-80 (Harvard U. Press, 1977). Unfortunately, "originalists" who
make this point ignore the challenges of social and economic acceleration altogether.
They may be right to worry about the tendency to "morph" the constitution for the sake
of adjusting to social and economic change, but the dilemmas at hand will not vanish
simply by kowtowing to the founders.
58. See Bryce, Constitutions at 72-73 (cited in note 5).
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process of legal niceties only moderately less arduous than formal amendment. Nonetheless, in many situations the judiciary
seems better suited than formal constitutional amendment to the
temporal imperatives of our high-speed world. As Cardozo anticipated in 1921, the widespread tendency among twentiethcentury jurists, especially in the U.S., to pursue supple constitutional interpretation and downplay precedent has often provided
jurists with the flexibility called for by a constantly changing social and economic environment.
Echoing earlier critics of the anti-formalistic course of twentieth-century American jurisprudence, the legal theorist Brian
Bix correctly notes that the most influential present-day U.S. legal philosopher, Ronald Dworkin, "emphasizes the possibility of
revision too much and the likeliness of settledness too little ...
[His theory] celebrates the notion of !he great individual judge
rethinking whole areas of the law .... "' 9 Whatever its faults from
the standpoint of traditional liberal jurisprudence, Dworkin's
theory meshes nicely with the structural dictates of a no less dynamic social and economic world. Indeed, the same can probably
be claimed for many of the anti-formalistic trends influential in
twentieth-century American legal thought. The universal phenomenon of social and economic acceleration may be one of the
reasons why both the U.S. innovation of judicial review and U.S.
legal thought have proven so influential abroad in the last half
century. 60 Social and economic speed generates difficult institutional challenges for every political system, and the U.S. example
of powerful courts engaging in flexible interpretation offers
proven devices for grappling with its consequences.
However well-trodden, the court-driven path of constitutional adaptation to social and economic acceleration suffers
from serious flaws. Despite its temporal Achilles' heel, constitutional lawmaking via formal amendment is conducive to relatively impressive levels of legal constancy and clarity. Higher
lawmaking by means of formal amendment not only implies that
constitutional norms are unlikely to change rapidly, but major
constitutional shifts will have to be achieved via express constitutional lawmaking, where a relatively broad set of political constituencies debates and gains familiarity with the issues at hand.
In contrast, the tendency to minimize precedent and condone
59. Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context 86 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2d ed.
1999).
60. Louis Henkin and Albert J. Rosenthal, eds., Constitutionalism and Rights: The
Influence of the United States Constitution Abroad (Columbia U. Press, 1990).

2002) CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF SPEED

379

flexible constitutional interpretation indicates likely reductions
in legal constancy, and the practice of continuously adjusting
constitutional norms to social and economic conditions risks diminishing the clarity of constitutional law as well. U.S. experience suggests that judges will tend to disguise even fundamental
constitutional reform as conventional legal interpretation; a
highly complex body of constitutional jurisprudence is the most
likely consequence. The enhanced difficulty of predicting beforehand which constitutional norm may be applicable to a specific legal scenario poses tough questions for those of us who
take the notion of a written constitution seriously. 61
Just as troublesome, constitutional change via judicial action
suffers from democratic deficits. We hardly need endorse a simplistic majoritarian conception of democratic politics in order to
worry about the specter of constitutional courts regularly acting
as the constituent power, or the potential dangers to popular accountability when courts are so overwhelmed by social and economic change that they are unable to distinguish between constitutional interpretation and fundamental constitutional alteration
in the first place. Nor does the narrow case-centered character of
judicial decision making always leave courts "well suited to confront many of the constitutional problems of modern life. " 62
There are good normative and institutional reasons for judicial
review. Whether present-day institutional versions of judicial review are well-suited to the enormous tasks of constitutional adaptation posed by our high-speed world, however, remains a legitimate concern. Constitutional dualism resists the notion that
any single institution should speak in the name of "the people."
The fact that social and economic acceleration probably has
helped transform constitutional courts into a "kind of Constitutional Assembly in continuous session" should worry us. 63
(C) Elected legislatures often serve as the institutional focus
for constitutional change, either by dominating the process of
formal constitutional amendment, or by discarding the formal
distinction between ordinary and constitutional legislation altogether. Examples of the former include numerous political sys61. In this vein, see the excellent comments in Kay, 13 Ratio Juris at 44-47 (cited in
note 4).
62. Bruce Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations 406 (Harvard U. Press,
1998).
63. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution 201 (Greenwood Press, 1963) (quoting Woodrow Wilson). Arendt seems rather enamored of this ambivalent model of constitutional
change.
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terns where formal amendment procedures place special emphasis on a positive (oftentimes supermajority) vote of the central
legislature, while Great Britain represents the classical example
of the latter. 64 From the perspective of constitutional dualism,
parliament-motored constitutional adaptation represents an ambivalent normative response to social and economic acceleration.
When they undertake fundamental alterations to the constitutional system, legislatures risk succumbing to the illusion that
they can effectively stand in for "the people" as a whole. By the
same token, their broad-based representative character arguably
makes elected legislatures better suited to many relatively mundane aspects of constitutional adaptation than courts, and the
fact that they need not focus on resolving individual legal disputes often provides their activities with the general scope missing from judicial rulings.
No less ambiguous are the temporal qualities of parliamentary constitutional change. Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein
have recently defended parliament-based constitutional adaptability for the emerging democracies of eastern Europe, arguing
that in the context of dramatic social and economic transformations, "a good deal of [constitutional] flexibility and 'ad hockery"' represent the sine qua non of political survival. 65 Given the
turbulence of social and economic affairs in the new democracies, "a general presumption in favor of flexible amending procedures dominated by the established powers, especially the legislature," is necessary to assure a sufficient level of institutional
adaptability. 66 For our purposes here, Holmes's and Sunstein's
view is revealing for two reasons. First, there is no need to
downplay either the special facets or manifest severity of the
enigmas faced by the eastern Europeans in order to acknowledge that Holmes's and Sunstein's suggestive comments implicitly underscore a more general dilemma: As we have seen, social
and economic acceleration indicates that constitutional systems
everywhere require heightened adaptability. Second, there are
64. In Ackerman's terminology, this model of constitutional change represents the
paradigmatic case of "constitutional monism," for which "the British design captures the
essence of democracy." Ackerman, We the People: Foundations at 8 (cited in note 43).
65. Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional Revision in
Eastern Europe, in Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection at 285 (cited in note 33).
Holmes' and Sunstein's defense of legislatively-based constitutional reform is also endorsed by Jeremy Waldron, ?recommitment and Disagreement, Constitutionalism, 29295.
66. Holmes and Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe,
in Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection at 295 (cited in note 65).
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indeed good reasons for claiming that elected legislatures may
respond more adeptly to social and economic acceleration than
certain competing institutional mechanisms. However, we should
not overstate the temporal virtues of the legislative mode of constitutional change. Since Montesquieu, liberal political thought
has typically envisioned legislative politics as predicated on a
wide-ranging process of deliberative exchange involving a relatively diverse and representative sample of public opinion, and
liberal writers have repeatedly underscored the unhurried prerequisites of deliberate (and thereby legitimate) legislative decision making. 67 Only if the legislature "takes its time" by engaging in a relatively lengthy period of free-wheeling deliberation is
it deserving of the privileged place attributed to it by traditional
liberal democratic theory: In accordance with this basic intuition,
Federalist 70 notes that the "differences of opinion" and "jarring
of parties" found in elected legislatures mean that "promptitude
of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit" there. 68
Real-life legislatures may very well succeed in rapidly adjusting the constitutional system to changing social and economic
realities. However, the traditional view implies that they risk doing so at the price of abandoning those slow-going deliberative
attributes which justify their privileged status in the first place.
The less-than-stellar record of legislative-based constitutionmakinJJ suggests that this anxiety deserves to be taken seriously. In addition, parliamentary constitutional adaptation may
ultimately prove less flexible than Holmes and Sunstein assume.
They acknowledge that the parliamentarization of constitutional
adaptation obscures the distinction between higher and ordinary
law. Yet they miss the most obvious temporal dilemma generated by the tendency to reduce constitutional lawmaking to a
subset of statutory legislation. As constitutional law comes to resemble an easily revised legal code, constitutions are likely to be
filled with provisions no less detailed than those found in statutory law. From one perspective, this trend seems advantageous,

67. The liberal account of the legislature as a deliberative body was influenced by
Montcsquieu, 11 The Spirit of the Laws !65 (Hafner Press, 1949). Within liberal democratic theory, deliberation has been conceptualized in many different ways, but the fundamental notion of a deliberative legislature has been well-nigh universal, at least until
the advent of "realist" democratic theory in the twentieth century.
68. Federalist 70 (Hamilton) in Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 426-27 (cited in
note 46).
69. For example, see Andraas Saj6's comments on contemporary Hungary. Andraas Saj6, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism 39-40 (Central
European U. Press, 1999).
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since it potentially indicates that constitutional law is undergoing
an express and public revision of its fundamental norms in accordance with evolving social and economic realities. However,
the easy amendability of constitutional law generates a troubling
unintended consequence. Statutory law books are already filled
with badly out-of-date rules and standards, in part because the
half-life of ordinary legislation tends to decline in the face of social and economic acceleration. The legislative path to constitutional adaptation risks exacerbating the general problem of legal
obsolescence by allowing for rapid-fire amendments to a constitutional document that increasingly will be pictured by lawmakers as nothing more than an extension of ordinary legislation.
The paradox is that the constitution's easily amendable character
simultaneously increases the likelihood of a legal system unduly
burdened by legal norms which soon appear far less relevant
than they did at the time of their promulgation. Parliamentbased constitutional change inadvertently loads the constitutional system with norms embodying quick legislative interventions whose significance may very well prove short-lived. Hence,
this mode of constitutional adaptation also seems destined to increase the complexity of constitutional law, which hardly bodes
well for the quest to preserve sufficient doses of legal constancy
and clarity.
A century ago, Bryce adamantly defended the parliamentary model of constitutional change, favorably contrasting Great
Britain's "flexible constitution" to the rigidity of the U.S. system.
In some contrast to contemporary defenders of this approach,
Bryce was forthright enough to suggest that easy legislative
changes to the constitutional system would engender a comparably complicated and even "mysterious" system of constitutional
law. 70 Social and economic acceleration increases the likelihood
of that undesirable consequence.
(D) Recent history includes sufficient examples of executive-driven constitutional reform, including France (1958), Yeltsin's Russia (1993) and Menem's Argentina (1994). 71 The authoritarian German jurist Carl Schmitt, who advised the Weimar
government during the republic's final crisis-ridden hours, is
probably the most impressive theorist of this path to constituBryce, Constitutions at 13, 22 (cited in note 5).
Arendt had this path in mind when she observed that "Napolean Bonaparte was
only the first in a long series of national statesmen who, to the applause of the whole nation, could declare 'I am the pouvoir constituant. '"Arendt, On Revolution at 162 (c1ted m
note 63).
70.
71.
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tiona! change. Schmitt argued that in socially and politically divided political systems, only a popularly-backed executive typically proves capable of initiating major constitutional reform.
Amidst crisis scenarios in which the necessity of fundamental
constitutional change becomes most pressing, amendment procedures are typically reduced to easily manipulated partisan political weapons, constitutional courts mask their fundamentally
political preferences in the disingenuous language of the "rule of
law," and pluralistic legislatures find themselves unable to decide on anything meaningful whatsoever. Only a mass-based executive, ruling on the basis of a plebiscite consisting of "an unorganized answer which the people, characterized as a mass, gives
to a question which may be posed only by an authority whose existence is assumed," is likely to possess the institutional integrity
required by the weighty tasks of constitutional reform. 72
Schmitt was so enamored of this path because he believed
that it could help dismantle the liberal-democratic institutions
which he so loathed. The fact that many who disagree fundamentally with his normative and political preferences nonetheless agree that executive-based constitutional reform contains
authoritarian implications suggests that he may have been onto
something. Constitutional dualism reminds us that no single political institution can legitimately speak in the name of "the people" as a whole. The executive's attempt to claim the mantle of
the constituent power is always especially dubious: Whereas a
broadly based, multi-vocal legislature can sometimes plausibly
represent a sizable portion of the diverse views and interests
found in society, a single uni-vocal executive generally cannot do
so. 73 In addition, executive-driven constitutional reform is often
accompanied by the specter of political violence, as other political organs are forced to cede their formal authority over constitution-making and accept purely advisory roles. Andrew Arato
rightly wonders whether any elected legislature that allows the
executive to monopolize constitution-making authority would
reasonably do so as "anything other than implicit response to the

72. Otto Kirchheimer, ConstitUlional Reaction in 1932, in Frederic S. Burin and
Kurt L. Shell, eds., Politics, Law & Social Change: Selected £says of Otto Kirchheimer 78
(Columbia U. Press, 1969). Schmitt's key arguments on executive-based constitutional
change are found in his Der Hueter der Verfassung (Mohr, 1931 ); Legalitaet und Legitimitaet (Duncker & Humblot, 1932).
73. This is one of the more familiar reasons for the privileged legislative status of
elected representative bodies vis-a-vis the executive in traditional liberal democratic theory.
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threat of force." 74 The crisis-situations that serve as the most
common terrain for executive-based constitutional change rarely
prove conducive to broadly-based popular deliberation and reflection. On the contrary, the executive justifies clamping down
on civil liberties and minimizing parliamentary participation because the dictates of the emergency situation allegedly conflict
with the luxury of time-consuming deliberation.
The crisis rhetoric often exploited by would-be executive
constitutional reformers is revealing. Since Machiavelli, executive power has been intimately associated with the possibility of
rapid-fire agere in juxtaposition to slow-going deliberare. 75 In this
spirit, Federalist 70 notes that only by placing executive authority
in the hands of "one man" can unity "conducive to energy," as
well as "decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch," be assured. 76
Montesquieu's observation that a plural executive conflicts with
the main purpose of executive power, namely its capacity to act
with "dispatch," was already well on its way to becoming dogma
by the time Hamilton outlined the basic structure of the U.S.
President. 77 The association of the executive with "dispatch" (or
speed) remains a crucial feature of contemporary liberal democratic thinking as well. For example, in a pivotal 1936 Supreme
Court decision that dramatically enhanced executive authority in
foreign policy, Justice Sutherland described the President as the
only institutional actor who "can energize and direct policy in
ways that could not be done by either Congress or his own bureaucracy. His decision-making processes can take on degrees of
speed, secrecy, flexibility, and efficiency that no other governmental institution can match. " 78 Executives who aspire to under74. Arata, Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy at 234 (cited in note 43).
75. See William E. Scheuerman, Emergency Powers and the Compression of Space
and Time in Yoram Dinstein, ed., Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (Kluwer Law lnt'l,
2002).
76. Federalist 70 (Hamilton) in Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers at 424 (cited in
note 46).
77. Montesquieu, 11 The Spirit of the Laws at 156 (cited in note 67).
78. Harold H. Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the
Iran-Contra Affair, 119 (Yale U. Press, 1990). United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co.
helped redefine the constitutional structure of U.S. foreign policy making. 299 U.S. 304
(1936). Of course, this example reminds us that executive-based constitutional change is
oftentimes assisted by other institutions (for example, the courts). In this way, my typology of constitutional change tends to minimize the empirical complexity of most cases of
constitutional change. The same notion of an "energetic" rapid-fire executive paved the
way for vast executive discretion in international economic policy. As Ackerman and
David Golove note, New Dealers helped provide the U.S. President with heightened authority over foreign trade by arguing that the "country's chief rivals were constitutionally
equipped for rapid action. Their chief executives could act promptly ... It followed that
Congress must empower the executive branch to move decisively to make the most of the
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take major constitutional reform obviously have much to gain by
using, manufacturing, or even simulating crises, since emergencies cry out for rapid-fire responses and the executive is purportedly best suited to initiate such responses.
Fundamental constitutional alteration obviously represents
a key aspect of constitutional change. However, constitutional
norms are also adapted to social and economic acceleration in
less dramatic ways. Social and economic acceleration risks transforming the executive into a privileged site for constitutional adaptation, fundamental or otherwise. Earlier in the essay I noted
that the intensification of social and economic change not only
requires a more-or-less permanent reinterpretation of constitutional norms, but frequent alterations to the fundamental rules
of the constitutional system as well. I also suggested that social
and economic acceleration makes it increasingly difficult to draw
a clear line between constitutional interpretation and fundamental alteration. These points are important for understanding executive-driven constitutional change as well. If I am not mistaken, there are pressing reasons for expecting the executive to
gain most from the process of social and economic acceleration.
Our traditional preconceptions about executive power imply
that executive-based constitutional adaptation is best suited to
social and economic acceleration. If 1) the executive is institutionally best-equipped to undertake rapid-fire action, and 2)
ours is a social world in which the need for rapid-fire responses
to changing social and economic realities is at a premium, then
3) the executive would seem especially well-adapted to many
facets of constitutional adaptation. To the extent that social and
economic acceler& ~ion implies both incessant reinterpretations
and frequent alterations to the constitutional system, substantial
doses of executive-driven constitutional change might seem to
represent a perfectly sensible institutional adaptation, notwithstanding its potential normative and political ills. Just as the distinction between interpretation and fundamental alteration so
often becomes unclear in legal practice, so too the difficulty of
distinguishing between the executive's reinterpretation of the
constitutional "rules of the game" and its fundamental modification or alteration of those rules is likely to grow.
Only systematic empirical res~arch can demonstrate
whether social and economic acceleration actually contributes to
nation's economic opportunities" Is NAFTA Constitutional? 48 (Harv. U. Press, 1995).
This type of argument has been more commonplace than I can demonstrate here.
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the amplification of executive authority long observed by political scientists and legal scholars. Nonetheless, there are good reasons for suspecting that the speed-up of social and economic relations represents a neglected part of the familiar story of the
growth of executive authority along with the corresponding decay of traditional legal virtues-including constancy and clarity-entailed by executive discretion. 79 Especially in foreign policy, the necessity for "dispatch" functions as a ready justification
for undertaking substantial executive-driven alterations to the
constitutional status quo. 80 Economic and social crises, and even
the relatively ordinary tasks of economic management, also risk
increasing the scope of executive prerogative, since the executive
seems best equipped to provide the rapid-fire institutional responses reRuired by the high-speed dynamics of contemporary
capitalism. 8 In light of the "rapidity, scope, and intensity" of social and economic change, the traditional association of the executive with speed potentially paves the way for unparalleled
exercises of executive power.
IV. REVITALIZING CONSTITUTIONALISM?
How then might we combat the tendency of social and economic acceleration to dismantle constancy and clarity in constitutional law, as well as privilege insufficiently democratic modes
of constitutional adaptation? A number of proposals on the table suggest that we need not throw our hands in the air in desperation. Ackerman favors streamlining the U.S. system of
amendment by minimizing the authority given the state governments by Article V. In his proposal, a successfully re-elected
President would be authorized to initiate amendments, which
would then be subject to congressional ratification as well as
popular approval by means of referenda taking place in the fol-

79. Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of
Public Authority (W.W. Norton & Co., 1969).
80. On the growth of executive power in U.S. foreign policy, see the excellent siudy
by Gordon Silverstein, Imbalance of Powers: Constitutional Interpretation and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Oxford U. Press, 1997). On Its challenges to traditiOnal
liberal conceptions of the law, see Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 Yale L.J. 1385, 1400-21 (1989).
81. Oren Gross, The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmiu's Theory
of Emergency Powers and the 'Norm-Exception' Dichotomy, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1825,
1825-68 (2000); D.J. Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official D1scretwn
(Clarendon Press, 1986); William E. Scheuerman, The Economic State of Emergency, 21
Cardozo L. Rev. 1869, 1869-95 (2000).
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lowing two presidential election years. 82 While liberating the
U.S. system of a key source of its extreme laggardness, namely
the necessity for ratification by a supermajority of state legislatures or constitutional conventions, Ackerman's proposal nonetheless strives to preserve the basic contours of constitutional
dualism. In an analogous spirit, Arato points out that the new
democracies in eastern Europe have institutionalized formal
amendment rules whose temporal requirements position them
between the "extremely rigid American or the totally flexible
British constitution" in order to assure a healthy balance between legal constancy and adaptability. 83 Recent constitutional
framers have perceptively tried to avoid the excessively static
character of the U.S. system of formal amendment as well as the
potential ills of undue constitutional fluidity. Arguing that the
U.S. finally needs to borrow from recent constitutional innovations abroad, Arato advocates "a new, more differentiated
amendment rule" which would allow for easier changes to political institutions, while insulating certain features of the constitutional system (most important, the Bill of Rights and judicial independence). A differentiated amendment mechanism purportedly would allow for greater institutional adaptability while
also protecting elements of the constitution where excessive
flexibility is disadvantageous. By exposing the Supreme Court to
heightened possibilities of override, an additional virtue of this
proposal would be its potential prowess as a check on the
Court's problematic tendency to act as constituent power. 84
Whatever their particular merits, proposals of this type illustrate how we might begin to outfit constitutionalism more effectively for the exigencies of social and economic acceleration. 85 A
central implication of the argument offered above is that any serious discussion of constitutionalism needs to provide adequate
room for the phenomenon of social and economic acceleration.
Worthy normative and institutional ideas about constitutionalism remain of limited value unless we can demonstrate their
suitability to our high-speed world.
82. Ackerman, We the People: Transformations at 410-14 (cited in note 62).
83. Arato. The New Democracies and American Constitutional Design at 324 (cited
in note 38).
84. Id. at 334-35.
85. Obvious concerns are that Ackerman's proposal unduly downplays the federal
structure of Article V; the key role of the executive in initiating amendments also raises
the specter of excessive plebiscitarianism. In a recent article, Ackerman seems to acknowledge the latter danger. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv.
L. Rev. 634,634-729 (2000).
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If such institutional reflections are to bear fruit, however,
they will also have to reexamine a traditional pair of assumptions
that played a crucial role in much of the argument developed
above. At various junctures I referred to the presupposition,
widely shared among modern liberal democratic theorists, that
deliberation involving anything more than a small number of individuals is necessarily time-consuming: When a relatively substantial group of participants engages in cognitively sophisticated
deliberation where a broad array of views is formulated and acknowledged, and a no less rich array of interests expressed, deliberation will have to be measured and unhurried. In order to
take a reasonable and thereby legitimate form, deliberation
takes time, and this holds for both political life at large (for example, in civil society) and for those formal institutions (most
important, the legislature) intended to be representative and
broad based in character. As we saw above, this assumption is
indispensable for understanding the U.S. model of constitutional
dualism, as well as the conception of formal amendment deriving
from it; the framers of the U.S. Constitution burdened subsequent generations with the demanding procedures of Article V
in part because they wanted to encourage a high level of circumspection in higher constitutional lawmaking. This assumption is
also crucial for understanding the failure of the existing U.S. instantiation of constitutional dualism to deal adequately with social and economic acceleration; formal amendment has been neglected in part because of its temporal misfit with high-speed
social and economic activity. As I also tried to argue in the previous section of this essay, some important institutional attempts
at constitutional adaptation can be understood as compensatory
adjustments to that temporal misfit.
We also saw that the orthodox picture of the "energetic"
executive as capable of rapid-fire action continues to play a significant role in liberal democratic thinking. I suggested that this
presupposition potentially opens the door to an executivedominated system of constitutional adaptation, and that legal
and political appeals to the executive's high-speed character
have helped justify its increasingly impressive powers. Although
empirical verification is still called for, this assumption likely
constitutes one source of the enormous expansion of executive
authority in the twentieth century. The dictates of speed cry out
for flexible, rapid-fire institutional responses, and the classical
temporal portrait of the executive easily leads political and legal
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actors to deem the executive best attuned to tackling the imperatives of constitutional adaptation in an age of speed.
But what if the traditional contrast between slow-going deliberare and high-speed agere no longer makes sense? What if we
need presuppose neither a misfit between popular deliberation
and social and economic acceleration, nor the superior suitability
of the executive to the imperatives of speed? In fact, the modern
executive is a complex institutional entity, made up of a host of
(oftentimes competing) administrative units, and the emphasis in
traditional reflections on the unitary and even solitary nature of
executive power obscures the empirical realities of executive decision making. Even when the executive branch acts unilaterally,
relatively simple undertakings can still prove arduous and timeconsuming, as anyone familiar with the less-than-efficient operations of most executive-based dictatorships can attest. 86 Uncritical reliance on Hamilton's concretistic description of the executive as "one man" meshes poorly with the decision-making
realities of modern executive power and the modern administrative state. Similarly, traditional temporal accounts of popular deliberation require reexamination as well. For example, early
modern discussions of popular deliberation arguably presuppose
underdeveloped forms of transportation and communication;
well into the nineteenth century, elected representatives were
forced to engage in time-consuming travel in order to meet their
colleagues, and correspondence or news might require weeks or
even months to reach its target. In an age of instantaneous communication and high-speed travel, the temporal presuppositions
of popular deliberation are dramatically different than in the
days of Alexander Hamilton or even John Dewey, as new technologies allow huge numbers of people to exchange views at unparalleled speed. The association of popular deliberation with
"slowness" no longer deserves the self-evident character that it
possessed for so many of our historical predecessors.
These concluding observations raise numerous unanswered
questions, not the least of which concerns the difficulty of
achieving reasoned and well-considered deliberation in an era of
high-speed communications technology. 87 But they also point to
86. For an account highlighting the sluggishness and inefficiency of an executivebased state, sec Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National
Socialism, 1933-44 (Oxford U. Press, 1942).
87. For example, see the lively exchange on the question Is the Internet bad for democracy? including contributions by Cass Sunstein, Shanto Iyengar, Ronald Jacobs,
Henry Jenkins, Robert McChesney, Jay Rosen, and Michael Schudson (26 Boston Rev.
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the prospect that social and economic acceleration contains positive implications for liberal democracy neglected in the story recounted above. Although social and economic acceleration risks
disabling democratic modes of constitutional adaptation and
contributing to the decay of constancy and clarity in constitutional law, it may also open up new possibilities for renewing liberal democratic constitutionalism. If liberal democracy is to become a progressive and forward-looking "vital force" as Dewey
hoped in 1935, we will need to think hard about how the age of
speed not only threatens constitutionalism, but potentially points
the way to its revitalization as well.

4-24 (Summer 2001)). See also generally Darin Barney, Prometheus Wired: The Hope for
Democracy in the Age of Network Technology (U. Chicago Press, 2000).

